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Extreme events are sometimes defined as unexpected events in which local resources are 
insufficient to cope with the extent of the damage and require outside resources to address the 
hazards specific to the event.  For that reason, communities immediately adjacent to disaster 
areas have a unique and important role in the study of measures to mitigate the effects of the 
resulting hazards to human life and property.  This exploratory study looks at the use of 
information technology in conjunction with disaster mitigation activities in areas adjacent to a 
large disaster.  The experiences, thoughts, and beliefs of individuals involved in mitigation 
activities at Louisiana State University immediately following Hurricane Katrina and the 
resulting large scale evacuation of New Orleans were captured through interviews in which 
cognitive maps were developed.  Through a Grounded Theory approach, the data was analyzed 
for theoretical fit.  In the early analysis the data grouped itself into three main stories; the 
Implementers, Decision Makers, and the Vendor stories.  
 The best theoretical fit was found in elements of Improvisation Theory.  Specifically, 
alignment was found in the use of “Bricolage”  in solving problems, the unique elements that 
resulted in a climate of openness to improvisational processes, and the improvisation of 
command and control.  Finally, other research questions that came up in the course of the study 
are examined.   
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Extreme events, or disasters as they are more commonly known, occur at a random, but nevertheless 
regular rate.  Still somewhat unpredictable despite advances in safety procedures, federal protection and 
mitigation projects, and meteorological predictive modeling, they wreak damage that currently stretches 
into the billions of dollars and is increasing each year at a rate well in excess of inflation.  The figures in 
Figure 1 illustrate the rise in the cost of natural disasters over the course of the second half of the 20th 
century.  (http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Study/RisingCost/rising_cost2.html)    
 
 
Figure 1.1  Rising Cost of Natural Disasters (Graph by Robert Simmon, based on data courtesy EM-
DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database (www.em-dat.net) Université Catholique de 
Louvain—Brussels, Belgium) 
 
While arguments about the effects of climate change are currently being developed and made, 
the reasons for the rise in cost are less about climate change than they are about human and 
technological change.  Today’s populations are obviously larger than in the past.  But increasingly, more 
people are choosing to live in to areas that pose higher risk to damage from natural and man-made 
hazards.  Human beings have a great desire to live in areas where they can enjoy the beauty of nature on 
a continuous basis.  The problem lies in the fact that the beauty of coastal shorelines, hillsides, and 
geologically unstable areas bring with them higher risks to natural hazards.  Another desire of human 
beings is for convenience.  Populations of workers have built communities ever closer to industrial sites 
increasing the risks of man-made events.         
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Another factor in the rising cost of extreme events is the technology-based society that has 
developed over the last decade following the creation of the Internet.  Computers and electronics have 
penetrated nearly every facet of our lives.  However, electronic equipment is much more sensitive to 
damage and much less repairable than the industrial strength equipment of previous generations.   
Finally, business today is much more efficient and has embraced just-in-time methodologies in 
supply chains to a larger degree. The result is that business organizations are much more interdependent 
on each other and sensitive to interruptions to the supply chain thus making those interruptions more 
costly.    
The hurricanes which struck the Louisiana and Mississippi gulf coasts in 2005 left an indelible 
mark on the cities, the towns, and the people who inhabit those regions.  These communities have a long 
experience with natural disasters and the rebuilding process as a result of the seasonal storms that visit it 
every year.  But the magnitude of the disaster wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita had no equal in 
the life experience of the inhabitants of coastal Louisiana and Mississippi.  The extent of the damage 
was such that while the effects of the storms may have been minimal a mere one hundred miles inland 
from the coast, the impact on New Orleans sent ripples that reached the entire breadth of the country.  
As might be expected, the impact on the areas adjacent to New Orleans and the Mississippi Gulf Coast, 
while a mere fraction of those areas and not comparable by any measure to the disaster sites, was still 
considerable.  The flow of evacuees from the large New Orleans metropolitan area put strains on the 
infrastructure and society of the surrounding areas.   
Extreme events are sometimes defined as unexpected events in which local resources are 
insufficient to cope with the extent of the damage and require outside resources to address the hazards 
specific to the event.  For that reason, communities immediately adjacent to disaster areas have a unique 
and important role in the study of measures to mitigate the effects of the resulting hazards to human life 
and property.  This study looks at those efforts, and specifically the information and technology aspects 
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of those efforts, through a Grounded Theory approach to attempt to learn from one of the largest natural 
disasters that the U.S. has experienced in recent times.   
 
Figure 1.2  Critical Care Facility, Louisiana State University, 2005   
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Chapter  2 – Literature Review 
2.1 Disaster  Studies 
Depending on your definition of “Man”, humans have been subjected to natural disasters 
since their arrival more than three millennia ago.  In more recent times man has contrived to 
invent a few disasters of his own and found new ways to expose himself to and exacerbate the 
effects of nature.  As the world’s population has grown, these “extreme events”  have caused 
uncounted loss of life and property.  In addition, the growth of societal networks 
(communication, transportation, supply) and the complexity of human organization have 
magnified their effect.  Despite this fact, research of these extreme events as an organized field 
of study is a relatively new development.  Only in the last few decades has a noticeable body of 
work begun to be published especially following the man-made event of 9/11 in New York City 
and the natural disaster wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.  Researchers who have 
recognized the need to understand these events have begun to try to define and organize the 
topics that are encompassed today through disaster studies. 
 To gain an understanding of the field of disaster studies, we should perhaps begin with a 
definition of a disaster or “extreme event.”   However, researchers have not found that task to be 
a simple one.  The website “ thefreedictionary.com” (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/) 
provides the following definition, “An occurrence causing widespread destruction and distress; a 
catastrophe.”   Another definition comes from the website of the Journal of Prehospital and 
Disaster Medicine (JPDM as of 2007) (http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu/vocab%20new.htm 
accessed 1/15/2007).  “A serious disruption of the functioning of society, causing widespread 
human, material or environmental losses which exceed the ability of affected society to cope 
using only its own resources.”   This second definition captures the element of a disaster that is 
commonly recognized as distinguishing these types of events from others.  It describes the 
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characteristic of disasters as typically requiring assistance over and above that available from 
local government and resources.  Disasters require or compel other, unaffected resources or 
organizations to come to the aid of the stricken area.  It is this quality along with the tremendous 
cost in lives and property that has caused extreme events to become an emerging theme in 
research today.   
 A perspective on the part of researchers that might seem unusual at first is the 
observation that while there are indeed negative effects of disasters, there are also positive 
effects (Pielke and Sarewitz 2000).  For example, a flood may devastate an agricultural area, but 
the flood waters may enrich the soil, enhancing crops in subsequent years.  By far, and 
unfortunately, the most beneficial effects of extreme events are the knowledge and experience 
gained from them and the hope that the lessons learned can be used to mitigate other events. 
 Presently, a good deal of disaster research focuses on studying decision making and 
improvisational processes that organizations undertake in responding and mitigating extreme 
events.  The use of social network modeling techniques, group decision support tools, and 
techniques that capture cognitive and behavioral processes are also seen as appropriate to 
developing data about organizations involved in these types of events (Mendonca and Wallace 
2004).    
2.1.1 Capturing and Assimilating Lessons from Extreme Events  
 One of the salient questions in disaster studies today is why, considering the regular 
occurrence of disaster, we have not learned to more effectively anticipate, respond, and mitigate 
these events (Donahue and Tuohy 2006).  Donahue and Tuohy (2006) state that true learning 
from these events is much more difficult.  The case studies and other documentary evidence are 
there, but they seem to be either un-communicated or when communicated, presented in a way 
that the lessons are situationally specific and cannot be generalized to other types of events.   
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 The problem of communicating the lessons from an event may be because the lessons are 
viewed from a phenomenological perspective and rarely related in a structured way and 
communicated in the context of the common set of adverse effects that disparate extreme events 
produce.  This means that while phenomena that cause extreme events are disparate, there are 
common effects. For example, the disruption of communications, contamination of water 
supplies, and displacement of populations could be considered common effects caused by either 
an earthquake or a hurricane.  It is now understood that different types of events may have very 
similar immediate consequences for responders and similar long-term consequences for society.   
2.1.2 The Future of Disaster Studies    
Despite the focus on the phenomena that cause disasters, from a positive perspective, 
specialized knowledge is being developed to address the causes and effects of extreme events.  
However, the lack of collaborative cross-discipline focus on the effects of these events may lead 
to research in disasters becoming balkanized and leave the real lessons of extreme events 
unlearned (Pielke and Sarewitz 2000).  Areas of ongoing research include the use of remote 
sensing, communications and information systems, warning and response strategies, decision 
making processes, community vulnerability, and methods for learning and creating useable 
knowledge from extreme events.  The contention is that what is lacking is an integration and 
collaboration of research efforts.       
Under increasing study today in connection with disaster research is the area of decision 
support systems.  Mendonca, drawing from previous research in jazz improvisation, pursued 
research into developing requirements for decision support software systems that could assist 
organizations in determining not only how to improvise in the response to extreme events, but 
also when to improvise (Mendonca 2007).  In his study, Mendonca used data collected from 
subjects who participated in the response to the 2001 World Trade Center attack.  He used a 
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cognitive task analysis method called the critical decision method which entails semi-structured 
interviews that seek to elicit knowledge about decision making in relation to the event and 
develop new knowledge based on a subject’s experience.    
The use of graphical tools in methods of sense-making of extreme events is another area 
of study.  In an attempt to understand the cognitive processes of emergency responders, 
Alexander (2004) conducted a study of the ability of individuals to visualize the circumstances of 
extreme events and capture their thinking about the appropriate responses to those events.  His 
study entailed having emergency managers develop spatial cognitive maps for a simulated event.  
Through the study he found that individual thinking and retained knowledge about a single 
shared event varied to a large degree.  This finding underscored and re-emphasized the critical 
role communication plays in managing and decision-making in connection with an extreme 
event.         
By far the most prevalent research in relation to disasters is the case study.  In a study of 
the events surrounding a toxic cloud crisis near Nantes, France in 1987, Roux-Dufort looked at 
failures to improvise and incorrect decision-making among four groups involved in the response 
to a fire that produced a cloud of potentially toxic fumes (Roux-Dufort and Vidaillet 2003).  The 
conclusions from the study pointed to the presence of multiple, uncoordinated groups as 
elements in the lack of improvisation and good decision-making in the course of the event.         
 The study of the phenomena of disaster and their effects has now begun to move towards 
efforts to distinguish and classify events that are predictable from those that can be understood 
but not predicted.  This research, combined with a new focus on the commonality of effects 
between different event types, is expected to contribute to methods of effective elicitation of data 
for disaster studies.      
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2.2 Cognitive Maps and Mapping 
The development of Cognitive Mapping as a technique for capturing the “ thinking”  
surrounding a problem or situation has been ongoing for decades and stems from the work of 
Tolman (1948) and from the theory of personal constructs developed by George Kelly (1955) 
(Eden 2004).  Personal construct theory proposes that people make sense of their world by 
seeking to manage and control the conditions and environment around them.  Because of that 
focus on an individual’s world as a series of problems, cognitive mapping is considered a 
valuable tool in capturing the thoughts and beliefs, or cognitive processes, of an individual about 
those problems.  Among other things, cognitive processes can include an individual’s 
perceptions and interpretations of an event or issue, and decision rules and strategies for dealing 
with uncertainty (Axelrod 1976).  At a higher level, cognitive maps may chart the connections 
between organizations and the environment within which they operate.  The connections that tie 
our world together and that we attempt to capture in cognitive maps are the connections that tie 
thought together (Bougon, Weick et al. 1977).     
 What exactly are cognitive maps?  The various definitions put forward by the many 
authors who have written and researched their identification, construction and analysis all sound 
somewhat similar, but each one contributes to an understanding of what cognitive maps are and 
where their value lies.  Cossette and Audet (1992) defined cognitive maps as “graphic 
representations of a set of discursive representations made by a subject with regards to an object 
in the context of a particular interaction”  (Cossette and Audet 1992, p.327).  That definition 
underscores the fact that it is the assertions made by a subject about a particular issue that are 
what is captured in the map.  The definition, or description, by Fiol (1992) that cognitive maps 
are “graphic representations of an individual’s thinking about a particular problem” and “provide 
a frame of reference for what is known and believed”  is very similar to that of Cossette and 
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Audet and underscores the fact that cognitive maps are fundamentally graphic depictions of 
thought (Fiol and Huff 1992).        
 Before accepting the purpose and value of cognitive maps, however, many authors 
caution against any assumptions of the empiricism of cognitive maps.  While the term cognitive 
map implies a map of the thought and belief of an individual or group, there are considerations to 
be made before accepting that premise entirely.  The “truth” or “reality” of a map is dependent 
on the adequacy of the theory underlying the model and on the method used to elicit the map 
(Eden 1992).  In addition, the thoughts and beliefs that are revealed in the construction of a map 
may be very different from true reality and might indeed, change at any given point in time and 
as memories age over time (Fahey and Narayanan 1989).  Finally, cognitive maps suffer from 
limitations in our abilities to quantitatively analyze the data they contain and their limitations in 
capturing thought that is not cause-effect based (Axelrod 1976).  However, cognitive maps have 
a special value in understanding human sense-making of complex situations and have a strong 
claim as a method for communicating that sense making.  More reasonable claims for cognitive 
maps are that they have the capacity to represent subjective data in a meaningful way and can 
contribute to a process of decision making, problem solving, and negotiation (Eden 1992).      
2.2.1 Efficacy of Cognitive Maps and Mapping 
 However imperfect cognitive maps may be in capturing reality, it is that quest to attempt 
to capture and communicate the reality of complex issues that attracts researchers to it and other 
methods.  The value of an empirical method of recording human cognition in relation to 
problems that vex society would be tremendous.  In the absence of such a method, cognitive 
mapping has become a leading technique in attempts to bring structure to problems and to 
analyze them.  One benefit of cognitive mapping is in its ability to surface the central concepts of 
an issue frequently referred to as the “nub” of an issue (Ackerman, Eden et al. 1992).  
 10   
Frequently, these core goals or options are known, but their relationship to other goals or options 
and to each other are frequently elusive.  Cognitive maps also bring the various detail of a 
problem and the chain of an individual’s thinking about that problem into a single focus (Fahey 
and Narayanan 1989).  At the same time, the technique attempts to overcome the limits of 
humans to perceive, understand, and make sense of problems, and to think beyond their 
immediate context or reality and the imperfection, impermanence, and mutability of human 
memory (Laukkanen 1994).  Finally, in today’s uncertain world, researchers contend that 
cognitive maps are important tools in understanding organizational contexts and provide a new 
way to examine and improve managerial decisions and judgment (Fiol and Huff 1992).        
2.2.2 Elicitation Methods 
 Researchers have described several methods for eliciting the data required to develop 
cognitive maps and each of these methods has particular strengths and limitations.  The three 
method types were described by Axelrod in 1976 and include derivation from existing 
documentation or text, questionnaires, and face-to-face interaction (Axelrod 1976).  The 
derivation of maps from documents is considered a valid and reliable method of elicitation.  The 
limitation of the method lies in the data being essentially fixed with no opportunity to further 
develop or enhance the data.  Thus the map is available to the researcher.   
The use of questionnaires for developing data is a popular method today.  This method is 
considered superior to document analysis due to its flexibility in capturing a wider range of 
information.  There is current debate that questionnaires such as the Self-Q instrument developed 
by Michel Bougon may be superior to other methods including open-ended interview techniques 
(Eden 2004).   
 The third method of deriving cognitive maps entails the use of face-to-face individual and 
group interviews for developing data and in many cases for concurrently developing the map 
 11   
itself.  The advantage of this method is that it allows the researcher to interact with the source of 
data and pursue concepts in the course of the interview.  This method can be further categorized 
by whether the data and/or the map are developed from a single individual or a group of 
individuals.  Another scenario combines the individual and group approaches by aggregating 
individual maps to form an aggregate group map.       
2.2.3 Map Construction 
 The mechanics of constructing a cognitive map on the surface seem relatively easy.  They 
are composed of conceptual “nodes” based on what is said by the individual serving as the data 
source and arrows linking those concepts together.  The linking arrows are qualified by positive 
and negative signs to indicate whether they facilitate a particular goal or option or whether they 
obstruct it.  As simple as that sounds there are several hurdles to developing a credible map 
(Ackerman, Eden et al. 1992).  One of the obvious problems is that it is exceedingly difficult to 
listen, understand what is being said, and construct the map concurrently.  Developing this 
ability takes some measure of time and practice.  Another pitfall that researchers new to 
cognitive mapping run into is their tendency to try and record everything that is being spoken by 
the data source.  A certain amount of what is said in an interview is repetitive but couched in 
different wording.  Finally, difficulties arrive in simply managing the recording of the map on 
paper.  In the development process the map may tend to look disorganized, but the use of A4 size 
paper and beginning the map two thirds of the way up the page help to reduce that 
disorganization allowing “head” nodes or core concepts to float to the top and “tails” or options 
to float lower in the map.  Head nodes frequently correlate to the goals of the problem and tails 
to initial options or conditions affecting the achievement of those goals.         
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2.2.4 Analysis of Maps  
 As mentioned previously, researchers have long known that maps are resistant to 
quantitative analysis, but the analysis of cognitive maps has shown that it is possible to bring to 
light information that would otherwise be difficult to obtain (Cossette and Audet 1992).  Over 
the past several decades several methods of analysis have been identified that can be applied to 
cognitive maps.  Some of the methods include cluster analysis, looking for potent nodes or 
options, virtuous and vicious cycles, central issues termed “nubs”, and shape (Eden 2004).  
Cluster analysis involves looking for groups or “islands” of related concepts within a 
larger map of interrelated concepts that have few or even no relationships with other groups.  
Once identified, the analysis of these groups can be pursued along two paths.  The clusters can 
be analyzed without taking into consideration connections to other groups or they can be looked 
at by including the relationships they may have to other clusters.   
Maps can also be analyzed by looking for “potent” concept nodes or options that may 
appear in multiple clusters that may indicate central themes.  These potent nodes are frequently 
an indicator of a core concept regarding the problem. 
Virtuous or vicious circles (sometimes referred to as cycles or loops) are another 
characteristic looked for in cognitive maps.  A circle with an odd number of negatively signed 
arrows indicates a vicious circle if the resulting goal is considered an undesirable one.  Changing 
the map by removing one of the negative arrows or causations, transforms the circle to a virtuous 
one.  
Searching a map for “nub” issues is another method of map analysis.  This type of 
analysis is also called domain analysis because it looks at the total number of in arrows and out 
arrows from a specific node to find significance.  The measures of the number of in arrows and 
out arrows of a node are also called the in-degree and out-degree of a node.   
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The shape of the graphic generated by the mapping process, while considered 
problematic, can also be a characteristic for analysis.  A generally flat shape indicates little depth 
in the thinking about a problem, but an awareness of a large number of options.  A tall, thin 
shape suggests few options, but a greater depth of understanding of an issue.  Individuals 
inexperienced in cognitive mapping tend to generate maps with fewer concepts and more arrows 
than more experienced researchers.             
 Recent research has begun to focus on detecting and analyzing change in maps over time 
in order to understand to what degree maps remain consistent and to study the forces influencing 
change if detected.  There is also interest by researchers in the value of cognitive maps in 
highlighting priorities relative to issues and their effectiveness in supplying information that may 
be missed by current mapping techniques and theory (Fiol and Huff 1992).    
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Chapter 3 - Research Method 
3.1 Data Collection 
The method of data collection and analysis for the study was based on the works of 
Kelton, and Ackerman and Eden (Eden 1992; Kelton, Mendonca et al. 2000).  In “Acquiring and 
Assessing Knowledge from Multiple Experts using Graphical Representations,” Kelton discusses 
a number of methods for eliciting expert knowledge from individuals and recording that 
knowledge using graphical methods.  One of the methods they discuss is the use of cognitive 
maps to capture expert knowledge from individual or group interviews.  In order to better 
understand the cognitive mapping method, Ackerman and Eden’s white paper on cognitive 
mapping, “Getting Started with Cognitive Mapping,” was used to gain insight into the method of 
eliciting and constructing individual maps.  
3.1.1 Subject Selection 
The source of data for this study came from the population of southern Louisiana citizens 
who experienced the effects of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and were involved in applying 
technology in the response to the effects of those events.  The primary participants targeted for 
the study were current and former employees of LSU who were involved in making decisions 
about, developing, or implementing technology solutions as part of the LSU campus response 
and mitigation efforts related to Hurricane Katrina.  A second source of participants was 
employees of Louisiana universities or agencies who were involved in similar technology and 
response activities as a result of the hurricanes.   
In recruiting subjects for this study, potential subjects were identified by looking at their 
role at the University and the role’s potential for the type of involvement in extreme events that 
are of interest in the study.  Typically, they were persons in technology leadership and 
implementation positions.  Special attention was paid to individuals who operated at the CIO or 
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CIO staff levels, departmental IT coordinators, technology architects, computer analysts, and 
communications and computer technicians.  They were initially contacted via e-mail.  The e-mail 
described the study, the researchers, and the nature of the participation being requested of them.  
Other participants were revealed based on referrals from participants contributing to the study.   
3.1.2 Interviews 
In order to develop the procedure for data collection, two pilot interviews were conducted 
and the technique for developing cognitive maps refined.  The pilot interviews were recorded 
and the recordings used to validate and further develop the maps.  The informed consent briefing 
and forms were also included in the pilot process.  The data elicited in the pilot interviews was 
included in the complete set of data used in the study.    
The larger body of interviews, consisting of an additional eight subjects, was conducted 
in settings chosen by the subjects.  The duration of the interviews ranged between 45 and 65 
minutes.  During the course of the interviews, the maps were developed interactively with the 
subject to insure continuous validation of the maps.  The complete interviews were audio-taped 
in order to capture further detail from the subject and for later validation of the constructed maps. 
See the Interview Guide included in Appendix A for the basic flow and structure of the 
interviews.   
3.2 Data Analysis  
 The process of data analysis involved all three types of data captured in the course of the 
ten interviews.  The three data types included the cognitive maps developed in the course of the 
interview, the transcripts of the interviews, and to a limited extent, the tapes of the interviews.  
The tapes were used in addition to the transcripts in cases when it was felt a richer 
communication medium was needed to understand the stress or importance of particular 
statements made by the subject.  The data was analyzed qualitatively for major themes within the 
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set of data recorded for each subject.  The process of analysis was influenced by the work of 
Baskerville, and Ackermann and Eden (Baskerville, Pawlowski et al. 2000; Eden 2004).  Early in 
the process, groups emerged from within the data along the lines of roles in connection with the 
subjects’ experiences during the event.  The subjects aligned into three groups which were 
labeled “implementers”, “decision makers”, and “vendor”.  The implementers group was 
composed of four individuals who were, in many cases, directly engaged in installing and/or 
operating the IT equipment and systems used in the effort.  The decision makers group consisted 
of five individuals who acted in capacities closer to the point where decisions on efforts and 
resources were made.  Finally, the vendor group represents a middle group operating sometimes 
within the other groups and more frequently, between the other two groups.  This group 
consisted of a single individual who was present throughout the time that the emergency 
facilities remained open at LSU and participated in most, if not all, of the IT initiatives connected 
with the emergency efforts.  The resulting themes were studied in the context of several 
theoretical constructs including improvisation (Wachtendorf 2004), adaptive structuration 
(DeSanctis 1994), and social theory (Bogard 1988).  Improvisation theory was selected as the 
best fit based on the developed themes. Based on the selection of improvisation theory, the 
cognitive maps were revisited and a group map, or story, was developed from the collected maps 
of the group.  Each of the stories revolves around several goals that the group identified as their 
primary focus during the event.   
3.2.1 Implementer Story 
 The map for this story can be found in Figure 2.1.  One of the first goals for this group, 
even before evacuees began arriving, was to set up a communications network for the emergency 
agencies arriving on campus (1).  The campus facilities designated for emergency operations had 
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Figure 3.3 – Vendor Cognitive Map 
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this goal including bringing in additional IP network connections (19), leveraging the existing 
campus wireless network (23), and alternative communications such as handheld radios (7).  Cell 
phones were of little or no use right after the hurricane as the cellular systems was saturated with 
call attempts from individuals attempting to make contact with family members (8).  It was 
several days before the cell system could be utilized to any serviceable degree.  E-mail services 
were available from a margin of excess capacity in the central campus system (9).  The presence 
of some skilled personnel and equipment from the central campus IT organization allowed a 
communications network to ultimately be put in place (10) (12).     
 The next goal identified by the implementers group entailed providing IT agencies at the 
sites with general IT equipment and support (2).  Despite the time constraints of the situation 
(25), the IT staff took the time to conduct a needs assessment in order to determine the entire 
picture and prioritize the distribution of limited resources (13).  The limited resources situation 
was exacerbated in the first weeks following the hurricane due to the restrictions on shipping into 
the Baton Rouge area (15).   
  In the short time before the campus had to be made available to state and federal 
emergency agencies (25), the capacity of available facilities in terms of people and beds had to 
be established (6).  Faculty members were contacted and asked to help determine those 
capacities (26).  One of the first things they focused on was calculating the total floor space of 
the facilities (27).   
 Many of the agencies that came to setup operations on campus arrived with little or no IT 
resources to support their operations.  Thus, the demand for IT resources was much higher than 
the available resources (3).  The lack of space on common carrier shipping resources prevented 
one avenue of solution to the problem (15), and the competition for the limited resources became 
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predictable as agencies argued with IT staff about why they should receive preference in the 
allocation of resources (14).      
 As the evacuation of New Orleans gained momentum, evacuees were being transported 
to the far corners of the state and the country.  Families were separated from each other with no 
means of finding each other even if they were within a hundred yards of each other.  A common 
goal mentioned across many of the interviews was the need to capture, organize, and 
communicate information about evacuees passing through the emergency facilities (4).  The 
issue of securing the data being captured was an immediate concern (18), but the urgency of 
getting the process underway made it obvious that normal security measures could not be put in 
place (17), and the unencrypted wireless and wired network connections were used to exchange, 
synchronize, and transmit data (23) (19). 
 A final goal described by the group was the need for a system to capture information on 
the thousands of volunteers showing up to contribute to the efforts so that they could be 
scheduled and allocated to specific tasks and any special skills exploited (5).  Since no existing 
systems or COTS software was known to fit the situation (21), it was determined that an ad hoc 
solution should be developed as quickly as possible (20).  An IT vendor who happened to be on 
campus was consulted and arranged for the use of licensed software and programmers to quickly 
customize software originally developed following the 2004 Tsunami disaster (24). 
 Finally, many of the subjects in this group described having no previous experience that 
they could compare with this event (16), and the constant struggle to accomplish so much by 
pulling together, in many cases, odds and ends of equipment and personnel (22).         
3.2.2 Decision Maker Story 
 The map for this story can be found in Figure 2.2.  One of the first goals identified by this 
group was to find a way for evacuees to communicate with their extended families living outside 
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of the disaster area (1).  Many of the evacuees had cell phones, but due to the saturation of the 
cellular network and the fact that few of the evacuees had chargers for their phones, cellular 
service was insufficient to play a significant role in the initial solution to this problem (17) (8).  
However, chargers were acquired to contribute to the efforts at a solution (9).  At that point the 
campus central voice services group was called in to provide assistance in setting up a phone 
bank for the evacuees (6) (7).    
 A second goal identified by this group was to provide IT resources to emergency 
agencies (2).  This situation presented itself almost immediately as the numbers of evacuees 
quickly overwhelmed the few IT resources that the emergency agencies brought to the site (10).  
Fortunately, the voice services group had been testing voice over IP (VOIP) telephone equipment 
and was approaching the point of implementing this technology on campus.  They were 
confident enough in it to deploy it to partially satisfy this need (13).  At this point, vendor 
donations of equipment further supplemented the need for equipment in this area (15).  The 
suspension of installation standards and other policies and rules allowed solutions to be put into 
service at the earliest possible moment (11).   
 The need to track, organize, and effectively utilize the thousands of volunteers 
descending on the two sites became an imperative almost immediately after it was opened (3).  
Attempts were made to assess volunteers for special skills in order to utilize them as effectively 
as possible (16), but ultimately volunteers were asked to do whatever was needed most at the 
particular moment (14).   
 The operations on the campus centered around two functions: the operation of a critical 
patient care facility and a special needs shelter.  The number of evacuees being brought into 
these two sites was well in excess of planned expectations and no provisions were made for 
information systems to track patient information as is found in most hospitals.  A system was 
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desperately needed to maintain patient information in these two facilities (4).  Initial work 
focused on whether any existing software systems could be adapted to the task or whether new 
software would have to be acquired or developed (20).    
 The efforts made to communicate and coordinate the needs of emergency agencies and 
campus units was identified as a problem which existed to one degree or another throughout the 
first week following the hurricane (5).  Several technologies were drawn into solving the 
problem.  While cellular systems were saturated from the voice aspect, text messaging was still 
fairly reliable and was used to mitigate communications problems (18).  Reserves of radio 
equipment were also put into the mix (19). 
 A final perspective of this group’s information points to the fact that while some 
resources were available on campus to draw from (12), overall the resources available were 
insufficient to meet the needs of all agencies (10) and the effect of the shortfall was felt in 
attempts to meet all of the goals mentioned by this group.    
3.2.3 Vendor Story 
 The map for the vendor story is recorded in Figure 2.3.  Unusually, the vendor story 
begins at approximately the same time as the other stories which is before the arrival of 
evacuees.  The reason for this was that the vendor happened to be a resident of the area and had 
come to the campus to proactively look for ways to contribute.  He worked with central IT staff 
in the collection of available resources for use in the two evacuee sites and observed the early 
needs for information systems and their associated inadequacies (3) (4) (5).   
Significantly, the vendor map differs from the other two in that the vendor experience 
was centered on a single goal.  The goal was expressed in two parts; the ultimate goal and the IT 
related goal.  The ultimate goal was expressed as the need to record the fact that individual 
human beings were passing through the sites so that families and emergency agencies at 
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locations further away from the disaster area could track the identity and number of people, 
where they came from, where they were going, and their condition (1).  The IT related goal was 
to put a distributed information system in place that was easily modified to capture this diverse 
collection of information and enable its transmission to sites further up the evacuation chain (2) 
(8).  While it was recognized that there was no off the shelf system that could be dropped in (3), 
the vendor’s vast resources, work and experience with other disasters from the larger 
organizational standpoint, and the sheer desire of the vendor’s employees at a grassroots level 
could be leveraged to augment the efforts on-site and deliver a solution quickly (13) (16) (19).  
The vendor team quickly adapted work done in the wake of the tsunami disaster to provide the 
solution (14).    
 The vendor story includes a sort of postscript in regards to activities that happened after 
the solution was put in place and the time and resource urgency of the situation began to subside.  
At that point, contention for the information product of the new system began with agencies 
arguing for ownership of the information (6), which was exacerbated by the lack of central 
command and control of the site (21) (23).  The influence of the improvised campus command 
and control structure served as a thin, but clarifying source of control over the sites and processes 
of the effort (22).     
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Chapter  4 – Discussion and Implications 
4.1 Introduction 
As improvisation theory was selected as the best theoretical lens to explain the events at 
LSU following the hurricanes, the best place to begin the discussion of this research is with an 
understanding of some of the theory surrounding improvisation.  Improvisation has been 
described as the point where the conception or composition of a solution converges with its 
execution.  One of the major components of improvisation theory discussed by many researchers 
revolves around systems that describe “ types”  or “categories”  that can be used to describe 
specific improvisational activities (Moorman and Miner 1998; Wachtendorf 2004).   
One of the early improvisation type frameworks was described by Moorman and Miner 
(1998) using examples from jazz improvisation.  Their framework described three types of 
improvisational behavior.  The first type of improvisation they described as an activity where 
only modest changes were made to a pre-existing process.  Embellishment and ornamentation are 
other words they used to describe this level of improvisation.  The next type of improvisation 
they described as activity where there is a stronger departure from the “ referent” , or basis of the 
action being considered.  The referent can be any activity that the improviser has immediately at 
hand to work with; a sequence of musical notes in jazz or a prior experience considered to be 
similar in some context to the current situation.  The third type or level of improvisation involves 
the migration to, or creation of, a completely new approach or solution devised in the same 
timeframe that it is required.   
“a member of the UNO information staff … showed up at the information systems office and 
was looking for a way to get communication with the [students and employees of] UNO 
reestablished.”  (reproductive improvisation) 
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Another system of segregating improvisational activities is based on outcomes as 
proposed by Wachtendorf (2004).   This system categorizes improvisation into reproductive, 
adaptive, and creative actions.  The lowest level is described as reproductive improvisation.  In 
reproductive improvisation, the focus is on recreating a capacity that pre-existed and has been 
lost or destroyed.  Improvisation occurs in the means used to accomplish the restoration of the 
pre-existing service or structure.   
“once things settled down from the initial crisis and school started again, … we needed to 
work on applications that allowed displaced students who needed to register with LSU. And 
there was even a late registration service center for displaced hurricane victims.”  (adaptive 
improvisation) 
 
The next level in Wachtendorf’s system is termed adaptive improvisation.  At this level 
an existing solution is modified to meet the requirements of the new situation.  Improvisation 
occurs in the creation of the changes to the existing system.   
“one of the big things that we spent a lot of time on and I had guys in Redmond and Walter, 
Mass. that work for the Groove Development Office that was doing a whole lot of work for 
us … in the back end to get that [evacuee] data out, to get that data into Groove so that all 
that information would be trackable in a central location”  (creative improvisation) 
 
The final level of improvisation in this system is called creative improvisation.  This 
level of activity entails the creation of a new solution without prior example.  The entire activity 
at this level can be considered part of the improvisation.  
This research proposes that the efforts in emergency response following the 2005 
hurricanes fall primarily into the areas of adaptive and creative improvisation.  Contributions 
were certainly made to the reproductive improvisation processes undertaken by organizations 
displaced by the flooding following the hurricanes, but only from the standpoint of consulting 
input and thus, are excluded from this study.           
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4.2 “ Br icolage”  at LSU    
 A core concept in improvisation is that of “Bricolage”, or “making do with the materials 
at hand” (Moorman 1998).  Materials can be anything that could be considered necessary to the 
solution being considered including tangibles such as computers, enabling commercial software, 
skilled or unskilled personnel, and customized software systems.  The ability of improvisers to 
use knowledge and memory for improvisation was also discussed by Moorman and Miner 
(1998).  They describe two types of memory and the interplay of those types in the process of 
improvisation.  Declarative memory is the term used for the human ability to remember facts or 
principles.  This memory or knowledge is not necessarily attributable to a specific experience, 
but is simply part of our basic understanding the world around us.  The second type of memory is 
procedural memory, or the memory of how things are performed or accomplished.  This type of 
memory is more often associated with experiential knowledge or knowledge of particular 
process. The true value of these memory types relative to improvisation is dependent on the 
improviser’s ability to use declarative memory to leverage procedural memory in creating 
solutions to the problems at hand.               
“we have the resources, the school was shut down so we had the labs that had the computers 
that had the printers that could be used. We had the laptops through the library stock that 
students could check out now; we used those laptops. The laptops in ITS that weren’t being 
used, we took those laptops. We used any resources we could get our hands on and put it in 
the PMAC and Field House.” 
 
Following the arrival on campus of the first state agencies and before the actual opening 
of the two facilities, the process of bricolage began as IT personnel began looking for ways to 
meet the demands for computers, printers, fax, and communications.  The technology 
environment of the University provided a source from which improvisation could begin.  A 
critical factor in leveraging that technology was the knowledge of where on the campus it was 
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located and who controlled it.  Due to the support from all levels of the campus, that knowledge 
and the permission to leverage those resources were quickly provided.   
“I didn’t have the skills to deal with every single situation but I did have access to people 
who did.”   
“Now [vendor] came to the rescue in the PMAC…. They came in and played a sizeable 
(role)…”  
 
Another component of the bricolage process was finding skilled, experienced personnel 
to put solutions and infrastructure in place for the emergency agencies.  That process involved 
finding people immediately available to make those solutions happen.     Finding skilled 
personnel was not so much the problem as finding sufficient skilled personnel to meet the crush 
in demand for IT resources and services.  One issue results from the tremendous variety of 
technology available today.  While there were many IT professionals in the Baton Rouge area 
and many others volunteering from around the country to come into the area, IT is also a very 
specific skill due to the large variety in hardware and software paradigms.  Thus, the utility of an 
IT professional in a given circumstance is specific to the predominant IT infrastructure in the 
space where improvisation is occurring.     
4.3 Openness to Improvisation 
 Another influential factor in improvisation that was found in the data was that of 
organizational openness to the process of improvisation.  Prior research discusses an 
organization’s openness to this process.  Frequently, procedures are documented and policies 
may require strict adherence to them.  In contrast, one principle of improvisation is that the 
situation and its characteristics will teach you what you need to know to find a solution if you let 
it, rather than trying to force one (Crossan 1998).  Further, to explore the benefits of 
improvisation to the fullest, the improviser must maintain an open mind to the real goals in 
dealing with the situation or problem.   
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“what I want you to do is make a wish list.  Let’s sit down for as long as you have, 20 
minutes, 10 minutes, whatever in between patients, and you tell me everything that you need 
in this facility and I’ll do my best to grant that wish” 
 
Openness to improvisation is more of a problem than one might at first suspect.  Many 
organizations, especially those with a narrow focus, find they are unable to break away from 
long-held approaches to interpreting customer needs and improvise efficiently or even 
successfully (Weick 1993). 
“But during that first week, it was just me going back and forth between ITS and there and 
telling - asking what they need, coming back here telling them what they need and then 
taking [back] the stuff that they needed. So I became the unofficial point person.”  
   
  Role improvisation was also found evidenced in the data.  Role improvisation has also 
been found to be of value in situations where improvisation and its benefits must be maximized 
(Crossan 1998; Kamoche, Cunha et al. 2003).  Role improvisation lets the mantle of leadership 
travel dynamically to the person or group most qualified in the process currently at hand.  In 
successive turn, the leadership role moves on to the next individual or group as the focus moves 
on to the next phase of the process or problem.  Due to the lack of central leadership in the first 
few days following the opening of the facilities, role improvisation in IT was constant during that 
time as the focus moved from networks, to equipment, to software systems. 
4.4 Timing in Improvisation 
“there was no central authority in place for them to authenticate to so everybody had to know 
a local I.D. and password on each machine.  Hind sight looking back, had we known where 
this was going to go, we would have put a little bit of structure in place around it but at the 
time, everybody was just trying to respond [and] put out fires.”  
 
 The importance of timing in improvisation or knowing when and when not to improvise 
is an important component in successfully mitigating a problem (Mendonca 2007).  The 
perceived risks and rewards are the deciding factors for the improviser.  Will the improvised 
solution work and what will failure cost?  And if it works, what will we gain?  These are a few of 
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the questions influencing the decision to improvise.  As the number of evacuees pouring in to the 
PMAC and Field House multiplied, the plans for accommodating them quickly became invalid 
and new plans had to be drawn up and implemented.   
“ the strategic national stockpile from the federal government had come in and brought just an 
endless supply of goods over to the PMAC, but would not share any of that with the Special 
Needs Shelter because the agreement was with Health and Hospitals, not Social Services.  It 
was the most ridiculous contractual nightmare I have ever witnessed.  So, eventually, we just 
commandeered those things “  
 
“Well, I had violated about 10,000 rules.  I said, that’s great, please report me to the state, 
federal government, whatever you’ve got to do, thanks, bye.  So, you know, I’m dealing with 
stuff that has no, is of no consequence” 
 
Decisions to override long standing plans and agreements were made and new 
agreements made as the situation unfolded.  Under normal circumstances, these types of actions 
would be seen as chaos, but in the context of an extreme event they are an essential component 
for success.       
 4.5 The Culture of Improvisation 
“we had a puzzle that we needed to put together and we had no box top.  So what we needed 
to do was figure out, what is this picture supposed to look like and what part am I playing, 
what piece am I and where do I fit.  And I feel like that’s what happened, and, you know, 
without people like Ric Simmons and Sean Robbins and John Morello and Brian Voss – oh 
my God, we’d probably still be there.”   
 
“There wasn’ t any, ‘Hey, I don’ t want to ask that person because they are going to make 
more out of it or I’m concerned about that or that’s their turf.’  There wasn’ t any turf; there 
wasn’ t any… you didn’ t have time.”  
 
 Organizational culture may be one of the most influential factors in fostering 
improvisation during extreme events.  The openness of an organization to allowing actors in an 
extreme event the freedom to improvise may be a deciding factor in the success or failure of the 
efforts to mitigate that event. In practical terms, this means giving actors the freedom to get 
involved, the room to make mistakes and learn from them (Crossan 1998).  It also means being 
open to allow actors from outside the organization to get involved in the process of 
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improvisation.  In the course of the Katrina effort, IT workers were given complete latitude and 
support to address needs as they arose without significant intervention from managers remote to 
the sites where the work was being done.     
4.6 Conclusions 
 The data collected for this study, taken in its entirety, forms a rich gumbo of experiences.  
For many of the subjects, their participation in the efforts to mitigate the suffering of tens of 
thousands of evacuees following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was one of the most rewarding and 
personally challenging experiences of their lives.  The stories related by the subjects lead to 
several observations.   
 The first observation is that the traditional university environment presents a rich 
environment for “bricolage” in improvising solutions in response to extreme events.  The variety 
and quantities of technologies and skills found on college campuses are relatively unique within 
most communities.  In addition, the presence of significant and capable manpower reserves in the 
form of students present a resource in emergency response that is not available in many other 
contexts.      
 Next, in connection with the leadership aspect of the research, the absence of IT 
leadership and the successful effort to provide IT in an unprovisioned space may argue that 
extensively pre-planned leadership organizations may not be necessary.  Do natural leadership 
structures form of their own accord during extreme events?  In essence, will leadership 
improvise itself if the necessary ingredients are present?   
 Finally, prior research states that improvisation can be enhanced by removing 
organizational obstacles to creative thinking and by creating an organizational culture that values 
creativity (Kendra and Wachtendorf 2006).  This study speaks to the value of the diverse and 
open culture of the university environment as a rich setting for mitigation efforts to extreme 
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events.  With a diverse mix of energetic, intelligent students; faculty members trained to think 
creatively and in the abstract; and industry skilled staff, these organizations are already tasked 
with the mission to solve the problems of today’s society.  As such, they come ready-made with 
a unique and potent set of ingredients that can be used to form an improvisational engine that in 
turn, can be directed towards extreme events.  The research of Kendra (2006) supports this 
finding as well through the assertion that there is utility in community organizations even in 
terrorist-attack scenarios and that these organizations may be even be more appropriate in civil 
contexts.        
  4.7 Future Research  
The opportunities for future research in the context of the 2005 hurricanes that struck 
Louisiana and Mississippi are too numerous to count.  Some of the questions raised in the course 
of this study are IT related and some are only indirectly related.  For example, one question 
raised by the study was “How significantly does the motivation of the actors influence the 
success or failure of the actors attempting to improvise solutions following extreme events?”  
Did the magnitude of the event generate a level of motivation in the public that basically 
overwhelmed or overran the problem? 
Another question raised was, “Does the solution-oriented and improvisational nature of 
IT work contribute uniquely to success of IT professionals in responding to critical demands?”  
Is the high-demand, frequently improvisational nature of IT an ongoing dress rehearsal for 
extreme events? 
And finally from a theoretical standpoint, additional research in this area could focus on 
the effects that the Katrina experience had on the technology organizations on campus as 
explained by adaptive structuration or social theory.  Some artifacts of the Katrina experience 
discussed in the course of the interviews point to a relationship to certain constructs contained in 
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those theories, but data elicitation was not directed on those aspects and thus no conclusions can 
be made.     
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Appendix A – Interview Guide 
 
 
Interview Guide  
(Some questions derived from”Decision Support for Improvisation in Response to Extreme 
Events” David Mendonca (forthcoming publication)) 
 
1. During the several week period following Hurricane Katrina, what major issues or 
challenges were you were involved in finding or implementing solutions for? 
2. In which of these issues or problems did you use, or consider using technology as part of 
a solution or method to address the problem? 
3. For each issue or challenge in which technology was used or considered 
a. What were your specific goals or objectives in dealing with this situation?   
b. Were there obstacles to overcome in finding a solution? 
c. What were the technologies and/or strategies chosen to deal with this problem? 
d. What were other options, technologies and/or strategies you considered to deal 
with this problem?  Other courses of action? 
e. Had you ever faced a problem similar to this before? 
f. Was time a factor in dealing with this problem? 
g. What type of training or experience helped you with this problem? 
h. What specific type of training or experience do you think would have been 
helpful in this situation?  
i. Did any persons or groups assist you in choosing a solution and what roles did 
they play in the crisis?  In the particular problem? 
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Appendix B – Cognitive Maps
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